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We analyze a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price formation in an intermediate-
good market: prices and net supply are non-negative, there are no noise traders, and the intermediate
good has multiple potential uses. Several of our results differ from the classic Grossman-Stiglitz approach.
For example, the price mechanism is more informative at high and low prices and potentially uninformative
at middle prices. Also, an informed trade by a producer of one final good amounts to a noise trade
from the perspective of a producer of another final good, so (a) as the price mechanism becomes more
informative for producers of one final good, it becomes less informative for producers of others, who
therefore have a stronger incentive to acquire information, so information acquisition has the strategic-complements
property between groups, and (b) having more producers (in multiple groups) become informed need
not increase the informativeness of the price mechanism.
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Since at least Hayek (1945), economists have understood that ￿We must look at the price
system as... a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real
function￿(p. 526). Beginning in the 1970s, Grossman (1977) and Grossman and Stiglitz
(1976, 1980) developed formal models analyzing this issue. In these classic models, some
market participants make a costly investment in becoming informed about the value of an
asset; others do not, but make rational inferences from the equilibrium price. The analysis
is intricate, because the price plays two roles: informing uninformed parties about the asset￿ s
value, but also clearing the market. This dual role for the price requires computation of the
price function as a ￿xed point, and closed-form solutions are typically not available. One
special case that does admit closed-form solutions is when agents have exponential utility
functions and all random variables are jointly normally distributed.1
Many of these models of rational-expectations equilibrium seem best suited as (and are
often intended to be) models of ￿nancial markets, as opposed to intermediate-good markets,
in at least three senses. First, models that assume normal distributions allow prices and
quantities to be negative, which may occur through short-selling and other practices in
some ￿nancial markets, but seem unfamiliar in most intermediate-good markets (where free
disposal keeps prices positive and the asset being a physical good keeps quantities positive).
Second, in ￿nancial markets, the value of an asset today is tied to its fundamental value
later, and this value is often the same for everyone. By de￿nition, however, intermediate
goods are used to produce something else and hence can have di⁄erent values to producers
seeking to produce di⁄erent ￿nal goods.
Finally, with few exceptions (e.g., Ausubel (1990)), the rational-expectations literature
has made use of a separate class of traders who buy or sell assets based on idiosyncratic
shocks. According to Black (1986: pp 4-5), the noise these traders provide ￿makes ￿nancial
1Examples include: Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Verrecchia (1982),
Admati (1985), Wang (1993), Veldkamp (2006), Yang and Ganguli (2008).
2markets possible￿and provides incentives ￿for people to seek out costly information which
they will trade on.￿ Formally, such noise traders ensure that an uninformed trader cannot
perfectly learn the value of an asset simply by observing the market-clearing price. In an
intermediate-good market, however, where di⁄erent classes of producers seek to produce
di⁄erent ￿nal goods, noise traders are no longer needed: now, an informed trade by a
producer of one ￿nal good amounts to a noise trade from the perspective of a producer
of another ￿nal good.
In this paper, we construct a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and
price formation in the market for an intermediate good that can be used to produce two ￿nal
goods. We assume that the values that consumers place on these ￿nal goods are uniformly
distributed with positive supports, which allows us to ensure that prices and quantities in
the intermediate-good market are always positive.
The main technical di¢ culty in our analysis is that, unlike in Grossman and Stiglitz
(hereafter GS), the equilibrium price function is not linear. We show, however, that the
price function is piecewise-linear over three regions of the parameter space. These three
regions emerge naturally from our assumption of uniform distributions on the values of ￿nal
goods, because uninformed producers￿conditional belief about the value of their ￿nal good
given the market price takes one of three forms: an upper tail of the prior distribution of ￿nal-
good values, a lower tail, or the entire support of possible values. Unlike GS, therefore, we
￿nd that the informativeness of the price mechanism depends on the realization of the price.
In particular, the price mechanism is more informative at higher and lower prices (converging
to perfectly informative at the maximum and minimum prices), but potentially completely
uninformative in a middle range of prices. This piece-wise linearity allows us to obtain
an explicit solution for the price function, which allows us to perform comparative-statics
exercises, including revisiting the seven conjectures from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
The existence of two classes of producers, each seeking to produce a di⁄erent ￿nal good,
plays an important role in our model. All else equal, if more producers of one ￿nal good
3become informed about the value of their output, then the intermediate-good price will be-
come more sensitive to (and hence more informative about) this value. Other producers of
this good will ￿nd prices to be a better signal about the value of their output and so will be
less inclined to become informed. There are thus positive within-group informational exter-
nalities (i.e., information acquisition has the strategic-substitutes property within groups).
However, as the intermediate-good price becomes more sensitive to the value of one ￿nal
good, it necessarily becomes less sensitive to (and thus less informative about) the value of
the other ￿nal good. Producers of this second ￿nal good will ￿nd the intermediate-good
price to be a less useful signal, so they will be more inclined to become informed. There
are thus negative cross-group informational externalities (i.e., information acquisition has
the strategic-complements property between groups). Additionally, if there is an increase
in the number of producers of both goods who become informed, the inferences that unin-
formed producers draw from prices may be unchanged, since the positive externalities and
negative externalities may cancel out. Thus, more producers trading on information does
not necessarily increase the informativeness of prices for either group.
Our interest in this model is both direct and indirect. That is, we are interested in
the model not only as a rational-expectations model of price formation in intermediate-good
markets, but also as a model to be embedded in a larger application. In particular, in a
related paper [Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2009)] we embed a simpli￿ed version of this
paper￿ s model of price formation in a model of ￿rms￿integration decisions. In this sense,
building on the present paper allows us to expand the focus of the transaction-cost/property-
rights literature on the boundary of the ￿rm (e.g., Williamson (1971), Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986)): rather than study the integration versus non-
integration decision of one dyad in isolation, in our related paper we analyze how the separate
integration decisions of a market￿ s worth of dyads interact through the informativeness of
the market￿ s pricing function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the problem. Section
43 takes the information-acquisition decisions of the producers as given and establishes the
existence of a piece-wise linear rational-expectations equilibrium price function. Section 4
analyzes the information-acquisition game, establishing the existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium. Section 5 revisits the seven conjectures of Grossman-Stiglitz (1980). Section
6 concludes.
2 Statement of the Problem
There is a unit mass of producers, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. An intermediate good (a ￿widget￿ )
can be used to produce one of two ￿nal goods. A ￿xed mass q are good-1 producers, and a
￿xed mass 1￿q are good-2 producers. Each producer is endowed with wi 2 f0;1g widgets,
and the total aggregate endowment is ￿xed at x ￿ 1. Without loss of generality, assume
wi = 1 if i ￿ x.
At some cost ci, a good-1 producer can transform a widget into a unit of good 1, and
a good-2 producer can transform a widget into a unit of good 2. This transformation cost
is drawn from a uniform distribution on support [0;￿ c]. Consumers￿value for the good j is
uncertain, with vj uniformly distributed on [vj; ￿ vj]. As in Grossman-Stiglitz, producers can
pay to become informed about the consumer value that is relevant for them. More precisely,
before observing ci, producer i who produces good j can pay ki to learn vj (without error).





Producers not endowed with a widget may purchase one in the intermediate-good market,
and endowed producers may sell into the market. All the random variables in the model
(v1;v2;ci;ki) are independent of each other. Denote the market price for a widget as p.
Producers not directly informed about the relevant vj (because they chose not to pay the
cost ki) make rational inferences about vj from the equilibrium price.
Equilibrium in the market for widgets is determined by the price that equates supply
(from both informed and uninformed good-j producers whose production costs are su¢ ciently
5high) and demand (from both informed and uninformed good-j producers whose production
costs are su¢ ciently low). If this price perfectly revealed vj, there would be no incentive for
any good-j producer to pay the cost ki of learning vj, but then prices would be uninformative
about vj. To avoid this result, there must not be a one-to-one mapping between prices at vj,
but this is no problem, since from the perspective of good-j producers, the random demand
of widgets by good-i producers is essentially noise.
2.1 Timing
To be more precise about the timing and assumptions, suppose there are ￿ve time periods.
At the beginning of the ￿rst period (￿information acquisition￿ ), nature draws the value of
good 1, v1, from U [v1; ￿ v1], and the value of good 2, v2, from U [v2; ￿ v2], both of which are
unobserved by all producers. Producers, who know whether they are good-1 producers or





whether or not to become informed. In the second period (￿endowment￿ ), producers learn
their index i and all players with i ￿ y are endowed with wi = 1 widgets.
In the third period (￿price formation and trading￿ ), producer i observes ci ￿ U [0;￿ c] and
’i 2 f;;vjg, a signal about the value vj of the ￿nal good they can produce. Let ’i = ;
denote the uninformative signal that obtains if ki is not incurred in the ￿rst period and
’i = vj the perfectly informative signal that a good-j producer obtains if ki is incurred. Let
si = (ci;’i) be the vector of i￿ s signals, which are her private information.
In the fourth period (￿production￿ ), if producer i has a widget and is a good-j producer,
she can transform the widget into q
j
i = 1 units of good-j at cost ci. If producer i does not
have a widget, then q
j
i = 0.
In the ￿fth period (￿sales and production￿ ), good 1 sells at price v1 and good 2 sells at







vj ￿ ci ￿ p + pwi
pwi
if transform widget into good-j
if not
so we can write ￿
j
i (v;si;p) = (vj ￿ ci ￿ p)qi + pwi.
3 Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
In this section, we take ￿1 and ￿2 ; respectively the fraction of good-1 and good-2 producers
who are informed, as given. We solve for the price function p￿ (￿;￿) that both clears the
market and communicates information to uninformed producers. Informed good-j producers







only if p+ci ￿ vj, so the largest value of ci at which an informed good-j producer is willing
to buy a widget is c
j
I (v;p) = vj ￿ p. Analogously, uninformed good-j producers are willing
to purchase (or keep) and transform a widget if and only if p + ci ￿ E [vjjp￿ (￿;￿) = p], so
we have c
j
U (p) = E [vjjp￿ (￿;￿) = p] ￿ p. Total demand for each group is then given by
D


















Market-clearing requires that in each state of the world (v1;v2),
x = D
1 (v;p) + D
2 (v;p) (1)
It is important to note that 0 ￿
vj￿p
￿ c ￿ 1 and 0 ￿
E[vjjp]￿p
￿ c ￿ 1 must hold for all
(v1;v2) and p(v1;v2). These conditions ensure, respectively, that demands for the groups
of informed and uninformed parties are never negative or greater than unity, which must
7hold since they are probabilities. Intuitively, this will depend on the di⁄erences between
the relative sizes of the ￿nal-good markets, q, and the di⁄erence between the supports of
the distribution of values ￿ v1 ￿ ￿ v2 and v1 ￿ v2 in a way that will be made precise later.
If ￿ v2 >> ￿ v1, v2 >> v1 and q is relatively small, then prices will always be high, because
the intermediate good is very valuable for good-2 producers who are relatively large in the
market. This will in turn price out the good-1 producers from the market. Throughout the
derivation of prices, we will assume these conditions hold, and at the end, we will provide
conditions under which they in fact do.
As in GS, computing the conditional expectations E [vjjp￿ (￿;￿) = p] requires knowing
the price function p￿ (￿;￿), not merely the realized price p.
De￿nition 1 Assume a fraction ￿1 and ￿2 of good-1 and good-2 producers, respectively, are

















￿ ￿p￿ (￿;￿) = p;si
￿
for all i, for j = 1;2.
2. (1) holds for all v1;v2.
We now establish the existence of an REE by construction. The price function is a
mapping p : [v1; ￿ v1] ￿ [v2; ￿ v2] ! R. Solving (1) for p gives us
p = q￿1v
1 + (1 ￿ q)￿2v























8the following diagrams, there are two situations.
Case A Case B







￿ v2 ￿ v2
￿ v1 ￿ v1:






￿ v2 ￿ v2
￿ v1 ￿ v1:
In case A, prices are always more informative for good-1 producers than for good-2
producers. Indeed, in the middle region, prices are informative for good-1 producers and
completely uninformative for good-2 producers. In case B, the opposite is true. We now
turn to deriving the actual price function that obtains under Case A. The price function
































































































































which is a ￿xed point of (1), rearranged in a more mathematically convenient way
q (1 ￿ ￿1)E
￿
v






+(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿2)E
￿
v





= p + ￿ cx ￿ q￿1v
1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿2v
2;
and we seek to solve for the parameter vectors ￿
1;￿
2, and ￿
3. To solve for ￿
1, assume
p ￿ p￿ (v1; ￿ v2). Then individuals believe that
v
1￿ ￿p￿ (￿;￿) = p ￿ U
￿
v




2￿ ￿p￿ (￿;￿) = p ￿ U
￿
v




where vj (p) and ￿ vj (p) are, respectively, the lowest and highest values of vj consistent
with the realized price level. vj (p) = vj and ￿ v1 (p) solves p1





































Similarly, ￿ v2 (p) solves p2






































Market clearing in (2) then requires

















































+ ￿ cx ￿ q￿1v
1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿2v
2;
where the equivalence relation reminds us that this holds as an identity in (v1;v2). Re-


































Similar calculations can be carried out for regions 2 and 3, in which p￿ (v1; ￿ v2) < p ￿

















































v2 + ￿ v2
2
￿ ￿ cx + qv









































Case B is handled symmetrically, and the calculations are carried out in the appendix. By
construction, our price function is a ￿xed point of the market-clearing equation (2). It is
reassuring to note that the price function is continuous across the boundaries.
Now, recall that we had originally assumed that 0 ￿
vj￿p
￿ c ￿ 1 and 0 ￿
E[vjjp]￿p
￿ c ￿ 1 must
hold for all (v1;v2) and p(v1;v2). We can ensure that these restrictions hold by making
restrictions on exogenous parameters. For now, I will provide su¢ cient conditions that entail
fairly restrictive assumptions on exogenous parameters. We can relax these assumptions
later. First, note that vj ￿ p(vi;vj) for all vi;vj if vj ￿ p(￿ vi; ￿ vj), which holds if





















Next, note that E [vjjp] ￿ vj, so that if the previous conditions are satis￿ed, then
E [vjjp] ￿ p(vi;vj) must hold for all (vi;vj). Next, note that vj ￿ ￿ c + p(vi;vj) holds for
all (vi;vj) if ￿ vj ￿ ￿ c + p(vi;vj), or





















Since E [vjjp] ￿ ￿ vj, if these conditions are satis￿ed, then E [vjjp] ￿ ￿ c + p(vi;vj) must
hold for all (vi;vj). All of these conditions can be ensured if ￿ c is su¢ ciently large. However,
12prices are everywhere positive only if qv1 + (1 ￿ q)v2 ￿ ￿ cx holds. This provides an upper




￿ ￿ c ￿
￿ v ￿ v
x




￿ ￿ c ￿
￿ v ￿ v
1 ￿ x
if x ￿ 1
2: The following theorem summarizes these results.
Theorem 1 Given ￿1;￿2 > 0, suppose (4) and (5) are satis￿ed. There exists an REE












































price function is given by (6). Additionally, p￿ (v1;v2) is continuous in ￿1;￿2;v1; and v2 for
￿1;￿2 > 0. When qv1 + (1 ￿ q)v2 ￿ ￿ cx, prices are everywhere positive.
4 Full Equilibrium
We now turn to endogenizing information acquisition. Recall that, prior to observing the
production cost (ci) or the price (p), each producer, at cost ki, can learn the value of their
￿nal good vj. Given ￿1 and ￿2, gross of information-acquisition costs, an informed good-j
13producer receives expected payo⁄
￿
j












































￿ v2 ￿ v2
1


















and an uninformed good-j producer receives expected payo⁄
￿
j












































￿ v2 ￿ v2
1






































￿ v1￿v1, the expressions for E [vjjp] and p￿ (v1;v2)
are determined based on the pricing function from case A or case B. A good-j producer will
become informed if the expected bene￿ts of doing so exceed the private costs, or
￿
j (￿1;￿2) = ￿
j
I (￿1;￿2) ￿ ￿
j
U (￿1;￿2) ￿ ki.
In words, in period one, each producer will consider all possible states of the world
(v1;v2;ci) that may arise, the price of the widget that arises in each state, her expectations of
the relevant vj (if uninformed) given that particular price, and the cost of the decision-making
error that arises from producing (or not) a ￿nal good without using all the information. The
expected cost of such decision-making errors is then compared to the private cost of becoming
informed.
14A full equilibrium is de￿ned as follows.












1. A fraction ￿
￿










￿ ￿p￿ (￿;￿) = p;si
￿
for all i, for j = 1;2.
3. (2) holds for all v1;v2.
The remaining task is to compute the di⁄erence in expected utility ￿j (￿1;￿2) for j = 1;2




￿ v2 ￿ v2
1
























The actual computations are somewhat laborious, and they are carried out in the appen-


















































if K (￿1;￿2) ￿ 1






￿v2: Note that when K (￿1;￿2) ￿ 1, we are in case A, and
prices are more informative for group 1. When K (￿1;￿2) ￿ 1, we are in case B, and prices
are more informative for group 2. When K (￿1;￿2) = 1, we are in the knife￿ s edge case
where prices are equally informative for both groups.
154.1 Information Acquisition
Since pro￿ts are separable in the costs of becoming informed, any full equilibrium with
interior values of ￿1;￿2 must involve cuto⁄ values k￿
1 (￿2) and k￿
2 (￿1) such that a good-1
producer chooses to become informed if and only if ki ￿ k￿
1 (￿2) and a good-2 producer
chooses to become informed if and only if ki ￿ k￿

















1 (￿2) and k￿




1 (￿2);￿2) = k
￿






2 (￿1)) = k
￿
2 (￿1) = ￿
￿
2 (￿1)￿ k:
It is helpful to ￿x ￿j and plot ￿i (￿i;￿j) ￿ ￿ k￿i, which is done in the following graph.
We see that for a ￿xed ￿j; ￿i (￿i;￿j) ￿ ￿ k￿i is strictly decreasing in ￿i. It is linear to the
left of the case boundary for which K (￿1;￿2) = 1 and nonlinear to the right. An increase


















2Heterogeneous information costs simplify the analysis but are not necessary for the qualitative results,
since the returns to information acquisition are endogenous.
16De￿ne ￿
￿
i (￿j) to be the group best-response of good-i producers when a fraction ￿j of
good-j producers is informed. The following graph plots the group best-response functions.




2, which in turn gives
us k￿
1 and k￿
2. Good-1 producers will become informed if and only if ki ￿ k￿
1 and good-2
producers will become informed if and only if ki ￿ k￿
2.















￿v‘ = ￿ k = 2, ￿ c = 1, q = 1
2
From this plot, we see several facts about this model, which turn out to be quite general.
First, the group best-response functions appear to intersect at the origin. This turns out
not to be the case, because neither group best-response function is well-de￿ned at the origin,
since the bene￿ts to becoming informed depend on the ratio
￿i





2 = 0. Secondly, the good-j group best-response function is increasing in ￿i.
This is consistent with the idea that cross-group information acquisition exhibits strategic
complementarities. Intuitively, as more good-1 producers become informed, prices become
more informative for good-1 producers and hence less informative for good-2 producers,
which in turn increases k￿
2 and hence ￿
￿
2. Third, for ￿1 > 0 very small, ￿
￿
2 (￿1) > ￿
￿￿1
1 (￿1).
That is, the group 2 best-response function lies above the group 1 best-response function for
￿1 arbitrarily small. Fourth, the good-j group best-response function is globally concave.
As more good-i producers become informed, the bene￿t for a good-j producer increases,
but at a decreasing rate. The informativeness of prices for good-i depends on
￿i
￿j. This
is decreasing in ￿j, but at a decreasing rate. The following lemmas establish that these
17characteristics are in fact true.
Lemma 1 lim￿j#0 ￿
￿
i (￿j) = 0.
Lemma 2 ￿
￿







i (￿j) is globally concave in ￿j:
We know that for arbitrarily small ￿1, ￿
￿
2 (￿1) > ￿
￿￿1





1 (1) or ￿
￿
2 (1) < ￿
￿￿1





In the latter case, there must be some 0 < ￿
￿











2 (￿1) ￿ ￿
￿￿1
1 (￿1) is concave, there can be at most one such point. Putting these facts
together gives us the following proposition.




2 > 0. Consistent with the










j are increasing in ￿vi, ￿
￿
i is decreasing in ￿ k. Finally, ￿
￿
1 is
decreasing in q, and ￿
￿
2 is increasing in q.
Proof. ￿i (￿i;￿j)￿￿ k￿i is increasing in ￿vi and decreasing in ￿ k. For a ￿xed ￿j, this implies
that ￿i is increasing in ￿vi and decreasing in ￿ k. Cross-group strategic complementarities




j increase in ￿vi and decrease in ￿ k. Fixing ￿1 and ￿2, ￿1 (￿1;￿2)
is decreasing in q and ￿2 (￿1;￿2) is increasing in q. This implies that ￿
￿
1 (￿2) is decreasing
in q and ￿
￿
2 (￿1) is increasing in q, which in turn implies that ￿
￿





Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) begin their paper by making seven conjectures, saying that
they may or may not be true in general, and then develop their CARA-Normal model in
which all seven are indeed true. We now discuss these seven conjectures in the context of
our model.
Conjecture 1 (GS 1) The more players who are informed, the more informative is the
price mechanism.
GS use the Blackwell criterion to order information systems. That criterion is not
applicable here, as it does not order uniform distributions with di⁄erent supports. One
simple way to proceed is to de￿ne the informativeness of the price mechanism for vj as the


















































if K (￿1;￿2) ￿ 1
Evaluating this claim in the context of our model highlights the need to consider (a) who
is becoming more informed and (b) what the price mechanism is becoming more informative
about. If more good-1 producers are informed, then prices will become more informative for
good-1 producers, all else equal, and less informative for good-2 producers. Further, note







depends only on the ratio of ￿1 to ￿2. For a given (￿1;￿2) pair, if both increase proportionally






then the informativeness of the price system does not change for either group. That is,
19Ij ((1 + ￿)￿) = Ij (￿):
Conjecture 2 (GS 2) The more players who are informed, the lower the ratio of the ex-
pected utility of the informed to the uninformed.
For GS, the ratio of expected utility of the informed to the uninformed plays an integral
role in computing the fraction of parties who are informed, and this conjecture provides
the monotonicity required to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution. In our
paper, the di⁄erence (rather than the ratio) in the expected utilities of the informed and
the uninformed plays the analogous role. Focusing on good-1 producers, this di⁄erence,
￿1 (￿1;￿2) is decreasing in ￿1, which is consistent with their conjecture. Within-group
information acquisition is a strategic substitute. ￿1 (￿1;￿2) is increasing in ￿2, however,
which is inconsistent with their conjecture. Cross-group information acquisition is a strategic
complement in our model. A literature has developed around establishing the existence of
strategic complementarities in information acquisition3. Our model does so in what we feel
is a very natural way. Strategic complementarities often yield multiple equilibria, but not
in our particular model, due to the discontinuity in the group best-response functions at the
origin.
Conjecture 3 (GS 3) The higher the cost of information, the smaller is the number of
players who are informed in equilibrium.
Our model features heterogeneous costs of acquiring information, so we need to de￿ne
what it means for the cost of information to increase. If we de￿ne an increase in the cost
of information acquisition as a ￿rst-order stochastic dominant shift in the distribution of
information costs, then for our model, this corresponds to increasing ￿ k. We know that
￿j (￿i;￿j) ￿ ￿ k￿j is decreasing in ￿ k, so it is clearly the case that ￿
￿
j is decreasing in ￿ k.




have ki ￿ U
￿
0;￿ k2￿
. As we just argued, it will clearly be the case that ￿
￿
j is decreasing in ￿ kj.
3Barlevy, Veronesi (2000, 2008), Chamley (2007, 2008)
20However, it turns out that ￿
￿
j is also decreasing in ￿ ki. This is true, because ￿
￿
i decreases in ￿ ki.
Since information acquisition exhibits cross-group strategic complementarities, a decrease in
￿
￿
i will then lead to a decrease in ￿
￿
j.
Conjecture 4 (GS 4) If the quality of information of the informed players increases then
the price system becomes more informative, but the equilibrium number of informed
traders may increase or decrease.
In our model, if a producer pays ki; she becomes perfectly informed with probability one.
We have analyzed an extension in which, instead, she becomes informed with probability r
and remains uninformed with probability 1 ￿ r. An increase in the quality of information
of the informed can be thought of as an increase in r. In this extension, a good-j producer



































The quality of information plays the opposite role as ￿ k, the upper bound on the cost of
acquiring information. In particular, we know that as r increases, a larger fraction of parties
will become informed in equilibrium. In this model, this yields ambiguous e⁄ects about the
overall informativeness of prices, so in some sense, this conjecture is reversed.
Conjecture 5 (GS 5) When there is more noise, more players become informed in equi-
librium.





increase. An increase in the uncertainty in the model increases the fraction of producers
who become informed.
21Conjecture 6 (GS 6) ￿In the limit, when there is no noise, prices convey all information,
and there is no incentive to purchase information. Hence, the only possible equilibrium
is one with no information. But if everyone is uninformed, it clearly pays some
individual to become informed. Thus, there does not exist a competitive equilibrium.￿
It has been shown elsewhere in the literature4 that if market participants are information-
ally large, in the sense that they recognize that their decision of whether or not to acquire
information a⁄ects the overall informativeness of the price system, this conjecture is no
longer true. In our model, producers are in fact informationally small, and this classic GS
non-existence result manifests itself as a discontinuity in the group best-response functions
at the origin.
Conjecture 7 (GS 7) Markets are thinner when ￿
￿ is close to zero or one.
Market thickness in Grossman-Stiglitz is de￿ned as the per-capita quantity of trades
occurring on the basis of di⁄erences in information. Di¢ culties arise in GS, because as
￿ ! 0, the trade of informed parties could potentially explode at a fast enough rate to
prevent per-capita trades from tending to zero. In our model, the fact that no producer has
any use for more than a single widget prevents this from occurring.
6 Conclusion
This paper constructs a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price
formation in an intermediate-good market in which prices and net supply are always posi-
tive and no producer trades on noise. The intermediate good has two potential uses with
independent values.
We emphasize several di⁄erences from the classic Grossman-Stiglitz model. For example,
the price mechanism is more informative at high and low prices and potentially uninforma-
tive at middle prices. Also, an informed trade by a producer of one ￿nal good amounts
4Krebs (2007), Muendler (2007)
22to a noise trade from the perspective of a producer of another ￿nal good, so (a) as the
price mechanism becomes more informative for producers of one ￿nal good, it becomes less
informative for producers of others, who therefore have a stronger incentive to acquire infor-
mation, so information acquisition has the strategic-complements property between groups,
and (b) having more producers (in multiple groups) become informed need not increase the
informativeness of the price mechanism.
The idea that there are con￿ icting forces determining the information content of prices
may apply in ￿nancial markets where di⁄erent traders trade for di⁄erent reasons (e.g., liq-
uidity, hedging, or value). From one trader￿ s perspective, if other traders are trading for
reasons she is not concerned about, then the fact that they are more informed about their
reasons for trading may merely increase the noise she faces.
In Gibbons et. al. (2009), we simplify this model of price formation and then embed it in
a richer setting, where the single player in this model is replaced by a dyad of upstream and
downstream parties. In a given dyad, the parties may or may not be integrated, and they
may or may not acquire information before participating in the intermediate-good market
(where upstream parties may sell the intermediate good and downstream may buy). This
model allows us to combine the single-dyad analysis of the integration decision that is typical
of the transaction-cost and property-rights literatures with the present paper￿ s analysis of
the price mechanism in intermediate-good markets.
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Case B Price Function






























































































































which is a ￿xed point of the equation










+(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿2)E
￿
v





= p + ￿ cx ￿ q￿1v
1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿2v
2;
and we seek to solve for the parameter vectors ￿
1;￿
2, and ￿
3. To solve for ￿
1, assume
p ￿ p￿ (v1; ￿ v2). Then individuals believe that
v
1￿ ￿p￿ (￿;￿) = p ￿ U
￿
v




2￿ ￿p￿ (￿;￿) = p ￿ U
￿
v




26where vj (p) and ￿ vj (p) are, respectively, the lowest and highest values of vj consistent



























































































Market clearing in (1) then requires



















































+ ￿ cx ￿ q￿1v
1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿2v
2;
where the equivalence relation reminds us that this holds as an identity in (v1;v2). Thus,
27we must have that







































































Similar calculations can be carried out for regions 2 and 3, in which p￿ (v1; ￿ v2) < p ￿

















































v1 + ￿ v1
2


















































￿ v2 ￿ v2
￿ v1 ￿ v1
so that we are in case A. We can then compute these integrals using the price functions
































































































































































































￿ v2 ￿ v2
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￿ v2 ￿ v2
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￿ v2 ￿ v2
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￿ v2 ￿ v2
1























Plugging in (7), (8), and (9), the right-hand side becomes
1
￿ v2 ￿ v2
1
































































































































































If we substitute u(v1) = v1 ￿ v1 and w(v2) = ￿ v2 ￿ v2 into the second expression and












































￿ v2 ￿ v2
1
























￿ v2 ￿ v2
1





























￿ v2 ￿ v2
1























Plugging in (10); (11), and (12); the right-hand side becomes
1
￿ v2 ￿ v2
1

















































































































































If we substitute u(v1) = v1 ￿ v1 and w(v2) = ￿ v2 ￿ v2 into the second expression and








￿ v2 ￿ v2
1
















































































The derivations of ￿1 (￿1;￿2) and ￿2 (￿1;￿2) for the case where case B obtains are similar
to case A.
6.1 Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that for a ￿xed ￿1 > 0; as ￿2 ! 0, K (￿1;￿2) ! +1. Fix ￿1.





























and thus ￿1 (￿1;0) = 0 for ￿1 > 0, so ￿1 (￿1;0) ￿ ￿ k￿1 < 0 for all ￿1 > 0. Therefore,
lim￿2#0 ￿
￿
1 (￿2) = 0. A similar argument establishes that lim￿1#0 ￿
￿
2 (￿1) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. This follows directly from the fact that ￿1 (￿1;￿2) is increasing in
￿2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that ￿
n























































2) ! +1. We have that in the limit, the left-hand side is in￿nite and the




















































































￿2 = +1, so that the slope of the group best-response function




Proof of Lemma 4. For K (￿1;￿2) ￿ 1, ￿
￿































1 (￿2) is concave in ￿2 if
￿￿
1(￿2)
￿2 is decreasing in ￿2. or if
￿2
￿￿
1(￿2) is increasing in ￿2.




































which is positive, since K (￿1;￿2) ￿ 1. Thus, ￿
￿
1 (￿2) is concave in this region. For
K (￿1;￿2) < 1, ￿
￿



































which is also positive. Thus, in this region, ￿
￿
1 (￿2) is concave. Finally, it is algebraically
intensive, but easy to show that
￿2
￿￿
1(￿2) is increasing across the K (￿1;￿2) = 1 boundary.
Since ￿
￿
1 (￿2) is continuous in ￿2 for all ￿2 > 0, we have that ￿
￿
1 (￿2) is globally concave on
(0;1]: A similar argument establishes that ￿
￿
2 (￿1) is globally concave on (0;1] as well.
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